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Paul A. M. Van Lange
Free University Amsterdam and Leiden University
(e.g., Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson, 1993; Samuelson,
Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, 1984; Wilke, 1991). It is
important that previous research has also shown that
the motivation to preserve a common pool is not
equally strong for everybody. Although people who
seek to maximize collective outcomes (i.e., prosocials)
carefully adapt their behavior to an imminent resource
shortage by cutting down their consumption, people
who seek to maximize own outcomes or differences in
outcomes (i.e., proselfs) keep up their high consumption
as if resources were still abundant (see Kramer,
McClintock, & Messick, 1986).
The Kramer et al. (1986) findings illuminate that
motivations are relevant to solving the social dilemma at
its most important moment—when the common pool is
close to being depleted. That is, differences between
prosocial and proself motives seem most important
when the dilemma is most pronounced and the collec-
tive consequences most severe. At the same time, exper-
iments examining the effects of personality differences
on individual resource consumption have always been
conducted in a “perfect world.” Participants were usu-
ally able to realize their intended consumption without
any limitations; that is, they could fully translate their
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Past research has shown that people with prosocial orien-
tations exercise restraint when collectively shared
resources are close to being depleted, whereas people with
proself orientations tend to maintain high levels of con-
sumption. This research seeks to extend this important
finding by examining whether the presence of noise in
social-ecological interaction may modify the effects of
social values in a commons dilemma. Participants were
taking resources from a gradually declining pool. For half
of the participants, the intended consumption was subject
to incidental increases in consumption (negative noise).
Consistent with hypotheses, noise exerted detrimental
effects on cooperation when resources became scarce, yet
these effects were only observed for prosocials, not for pro-
selfs. These results indicate that noise in social-ecological
interaction plays an important role in common-pool man-
agement. It tends to undermine cooperation among those
who are otherwise inclined to save resources.
Keywords: social interaction; cooperation; conservation;
noise; social value orientation; commons dilemma
The collective management of common-poolresources such as freshwater or energy can be seen
as an instance of the broad category of situations called
social dilemmas, or more specifically as a commons
dilemma (e.g., Hardin, 1968; Kelley et al., 2003;
Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002; Suleiman,
Budescu, Fischer, & Messick, 2004; Van Vugt, Snyder,
Tyler, & Biel, 2000). The literature on commons dilem-
mas has repeatedly shown that apart from tenden-
cies toward pursuing self-interest or tendencies toward
conformity, people also may exhibit a strong tendency
to preserve common-pool resources from being depleted
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intended actions into real effects on the pool, as if there
were no external barriers or factors that might prevent
them from doing so.
This perfect-world assumption is unrealistic. We sug-
gest that people often have a lack of information about
the impact of their own behavior on collective and eco-
logical outcomes. One simply does not always know
when the consequences of one’s own consumption
behavior may be (much) worse than it was intended.
Often, people cannot fully translate their intended
actions into real effects on a natural resource because
they are partly lacking the means to do so or their
means are not sufficient. For example, people may
intend to use public transport to go to work but the
schedule of public transport does not fit well with their
working schedule (e.g., there is only one bus per hour
on a particular line). In real life, therefore, people may
often achieve their personal goals (e.g., going from A to
B), but the actual social and ecological outcomes may
be worse than actually intended (e.g., going by car is
burning more fossil fuel than going by public transport)
due to noise in social-ecological interaction, a concept
explained in the following.1
NOISE IN SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL INTERACTION
For dyadic situations, noise is formally defined as
discrepancies between intended and actual outcomes for
an interaction partner due to unintended errors (e.g.,
Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Bendor, Kramer, & Stout,
1991; Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002). If
both parties act in a reciprocal manner, such unintended
errors may lead to an escalation of conflict according to
the so-called echo effect (Axelrod, 1984). If one party
misperceives the unintended defection of the other party
as an intended act of noncooperation, it may respond
with intended defection in turn, which may lead to end-
less cycles of mutual defection. For both parties, the
result of such misunderstandings may be quite bad. For
example, a business deal may fail because of unrealized
meetings, or a romantic relationship may break up
because of misguided conversations. However, such
unwanted developments can be prevented with means
that may facilitate cooperation in the presence of noise,
for example, generosity (Van Lange et al., 2002; Wu &
Axelrod, 1995), communication (Tazelaar, Van Lange,
& Ouwerkerk, 2004), or empathy (Rumble, Van Lange,
& Parks, 2005).
For social interaction in n-person situations, in con-
trast, noise has not yet been examined, as far as we
know. At the same time, noise is a fact of everyday
life, in dyadic as well as n-person situations, whether
they only include social interaction within a group (e.g.,
providing a collective good) or whether they addition-
ally include the social-ecological interaction between a
group and a natural resource with its own characteris-
tics, such as an own regeneration rate. What are some
examples of discrepancies between intended outcomes
and actual outcomes for the collective and for the res-
ource in commons dilemmas? We would suggest that
people may not always have complete information
about the magnitude of the detrimental effects of some
forms of consumption or indeed, that they are consum-
ing too much, or they do not realize how severely their
consumption contributes to the depleting of natural
resources. We all perform a multitude of consumption
behaviors in everyday life. Some of them may be more
prone to noise than others, as we do not always know
in advance to what extent we are able to realize our
desired impact on natural resources, and unfortunately,
our “ecological footprint” may often be bigger than we
actually intended—at least, as often suggested by envi-
ronmental scientists.
Noise, then, may be seen as external barriers, partly
or fully out of people’s control, by which they literally
cannot translate their cooperative intentions into con-
servational consumption behaviors in their everyday
life. For example, despite conscientious attempts to
reduce the use of water during a drought, people may
not be fully able to do so because their sanitary instal-
lations are not allowing for a careful use of water (e.g.,
the toilet’s flusher may not be adjustable). Or despite
intentional attempts to reduce one’s own car use during
times of hot weather and increased levels of ozone on
the ground, people may not be able to use public trans-
port because it does not run at the appropriate times.
Hence, it does not seem hard to generate examples of
noise in n-person situations of social-ecological interac-
tion. In each of these examples, prosocial and ecologi-
cally motivated behavior is constrained by the presence
of noise, and people get feedback that natural resources
are in a bad state and in decline. We will show that it is
this combination of noise and the feedback about
declining resources that is leading to detrimental behav-
ioral effects in persons with prosocial motivations. For
that, we first need to discuss the concept of social value
orientation in greater detail.
SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND NOISE
IN A COMMONS DILEMMA
Social value orientations have shown to be predictive of
consumption behavior in a commons dilemma (e.g.,
Kramer et al., 1986; Parks, 1994). Prosocials (i.e., cooper-
ative individuals), in contrast to proselfs (i.e., individualis-
tic or competitive individuals), are assumed to follow the
Brucks, Van Lange / SOCIAL VALUES AND NOISE 751
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goal of maximizing as well as equalizing collective out-
comes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Van Lange, 1999). In a
commons dilemma, this combined goal, especially the part
of maximizing joint outcomes, can only be satisfied with
maintaining the common pool as long as possible. The
longer the group can consume from the pool, the higher
will be the collective outcome in the long run. Therefore, it
seems safe to assume that prosocials, compared to proselfs,
should have a stronger motive to preserve the pool.
Indeed, Kramer et al. (1986) have shown that proso-
cials try to prevent an imminent collapse of the pool,
whereas proselfs continue harvesting without adapting
to a situation of scarcity. But when prosocials realize
that their deliberative attempts to preserve the pool are
fruitless due to noise in their consumption decisions,
and the pool is deteriorating anyway, they may stop
conserving and begin pursuing the goal of equality in
outcomes by taking as much as they believe others do.
The behavior of proselfs, on the other hand, should not
be affected that drastically by the presence of noise, as
their motivation to preserve the pool is low in any case
(see Kramer et al., 1986).
Besides the social value orientation of a decision
maker, we presume the actual pool size to be another
moderator for the effects of noise on consumption
behavior. Several models of human resource use (e.g.,
Brucks, 2004; Mosler & Brucks, 2003; Wilke, 1991; see
also Gifford & Hine, 1997) propose that the conserva-
tional motive of an individual is particularly strong
when the pool is perceived as deteriorating. A large
body of research (e.g., Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson
et al., 1984) supports this notion with the observation
that many people—especially prosocials, as was
explained above—adapt to a reduction of pool size by
cutting down their consumption. Therefore, we assume
that the detrimental effects of noise should be particu-
larly influential when people get the feedback that the
resource is in decline, as noise may weaken their motive
to preserve the pool from being exhausted.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
For this research, we used a repeated commons
dilemma task with preprogrammed feedback about the
pool size. The participants were made to believe that they
managed a common pool in groups of five, that
the pool size steadily decreased over the 24 trials of the
task, and that the group finally emptied the pool for sim-
ilar designs, (see Brucks, 2004, or Roch & Samuelson,
1997).2 Participants received no feedback at all about oth-
ers’ behavior. To make sure that participants attributed the
cause for the decline of the pool to the—potentially
noisy—behavior of the group, and not to the pool
dynamics themselves, we informed them that the regen-
eration of the pool is kept constant in all trials. As in pre-
vious studies on noise (e.g., Van Lange et al., 2002),
participants could make a continuous choice on an inter-
val scale, in this case between 11 options to consume
from 0 to 10 points from the common pool on each trial.
Half of the participants were told that the computer
is changing their consumption decisions from time to
time by adding between 0 and 2 points to their actual
choice (i.e., noise). In noisy trials, participants did
receive whatever number of points they asked for but
the computer did possibly take out 0, 1, or 2 points
more than that out of the pool. This way, noise had
potentially negative effects on the pool size but no
effects—neither positive nor negative ones—on the
immediate outcome for the participant. As an analogy
to real life, people always achieved their goals (e.g.,
heating the apartment), but the effects of their behavior
on natural resources (e.g., the fuel consumption) were
worse than intended. We informed participants in the
noise condition beforehand that such a modification of
their choice could happen in any trial of the task.
However, in only 9 predetermined trials of all 24 trials
(i.e., in 37.5%) did they actually get feedback that the
computer had modified their choice after they had
already made it. Furthermore, such incidents of noise
were supposed to occur to all members of the group in
the same fashion but not necessarily at the same time
and with the same frequency.
Based on the line of reasoning presented earlier, we
anticipated that the detriment of noise would be espe-
cially pronounced for individuals with prosocial orienta-
tion rather than for individuals with proself orientation.
Moreover, we hypothesized this pattern only when over-
consumption would really matter (i.e., when the
resources are close to being depleted) rather than when
the pool is abundant and can afford a good deal of con-
sumption. Thus, we expected that cooperation would
be influenced by all three variables under study such
that noise exerts detrimental effects on levels of cooper-
ation for prosocials (and less for proselfs) when the
resources are scarce rather than abundant.
METHOD
Participants and Experimental Design
A total of 176 undergraduate students—107 women
and 69 men, with an average age of 21 years—of a large
Dutch university took part in this study and were paid
€5 in exchange for participation (this equaled about
US$6.70). Furthermore, they were told in advance to
enhance their chances in a lottery for about five cash
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prizes of €10 with each point they made in the com-
mons dilemma task.
The experimental design was a 2 (social value orienta-
tion: prosocial vs. proself) × 2 (noise: no noise vs. noise) ×
2 (pool size: big vs. small) ANOVA, with the former two
variables being between-subjects variables and the latter
variable being a within-subjects variable (for means, see
Table 1). Participants were randomly assigned to the noise
and no-noise conditions. The dependent variable was the
level of consumption from the common pool.
Procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, each participant was
greeted and escorted to one of seven cubicles, equipped
with a personal computer, which prevented any kind of
contact between participants during the whole session.
The stimulus material of the experiment was presented
on a computer screen using a program written in
Authorware Professional (Version 7). Participants
responded by using the keyboard of the computer.
After being welcomed, participants were informed
that the study would last between about 30 to 40 min.
Then, they were told that the study would consist of
two parts that were presumably unrelated to each other.
In the first part, their social value orientations were
assessed by means of a commonly used decomposed
games measure. In the second part, participants engaged
in the commons dilemma task. Thereafter, they indi-
cated their age and gender. After completion, partici-
pants were asked to leave the cubicle and were thanked,
paid, and debriefed. In the following, we describe each
part of the study in detail.
Assessment of social value orientations. Participants’
social value orientations were assessed with the nine-item
decomposed game measure—described in detail in Van
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, and Joireman (1997)—that is
known to be a valid and reliable method of measuring
interpersonal orientations (e.g., De Dreu & Boles, 1998;
Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986; McClintock &
Allison, 1989; Parks, 1994; Van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994). Participants were asked to decide nine times how
they wanted to split up points between themselves and
another person. The other was said to be someone that
they did not know and that they would never knowingly
meet in the future so as to examine participants’ general
tendencies toward others. The instructions briefly note
that the other will be making choices so as to induce
some interdependence between the participant and the
other. Outcomes were presented in terms of points, and
participants were asked to imagine that the points had
value to themselves as well as to the other person. Similar
instructions have been used in past research (e.g., see
Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Van Lange, Agnew,
Harinck, & Steemers, 1997). In each decision, they had
the choice between a cooperative option (i.e., maximizing
joint outcomes), an individualistic option (i.e., maximiz-
ing own outcomes), and a competitive option (i.e., maxi-
mizing relative differences).
Participants were classified as either prosocials if
they chose six times or more the cooperative allocation
of points, or they were classified as proselfs if they chose
six times or more the individualistic or competitive allo-
cation of points. As in previous research, individualists
and competitors were pooled to proselfs, as they share
the motive to maximize own outcomes, either in an
TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Individuals’ Consumption Behavior by Pool Size, Social Value Orientation, and Noise
Social Value Orientation
Prosocials Proselfs 
(n = 68) (n = 67)
M M
Noise Pool Size (SD) (SD) Total M Grand M
Big 6.20 6.79 6.49
No noise (1.97) (1.50) 6.34
(n = 68) Small 5.61 6.82 6.19
(2.52) (2.19)
Big 5.79 6.76 6.28
Noise (2.05) (1.59) 6.48
(n = 67) Small 6.76 6.58 6.67
(2.81) (2.11)
Grand M 6.10 6.74 6.41
NOTE: Higher values represent higher levels of consumption on a 0-10 scale.
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absolute or in a relative sense. According to these crite-
ria, 68 participants (38.6%) were classified as proso-
cials and 67 (38.1%) as proselfs. Forty-one participants
(23.3%) could not be classified because they made
fewer than six consistent choices. Although the percent-
ages of unclassifiable participants may seem rather high,
it is actually not much different from some past research
using even large samples (e.g., Van Lange, Agnew,
et al., 1997). Therefore, all subsequent data analyses
have an n of 135 instead of the original 176.
Commons dilemma task. After completing the
instrument for assessing social value orientations, par-
ticipants received instructions that they are getting
connected with four others in the laboratory via a
computer network in order to work on an independent
group task. In these groups of five, they were supposed
to share a common pool of points. They learned that
each one could take between 0 and 10 points out of
the pool, all at the same time. After each and every one
had made a decision, the computer would multiply the
remaining number of points by 1.5. Then, a new
round would begin where points could be taken out of
the pool again. The group task would go on like this
until the pool was empty or until the experimenter
stopped it. A numerical example was presented: If the
pool had 50 points and the participant decided to take
out 5 points, whereas the other group members take 0,
3, 4, and 8 points, respectively, the collective usage in
that particular round would be 20 points to be sub-
tracted from the pool. The remaining 30 points get
multiplied by 1.5, which leaves 45 points in the pool
for the next round.
As an incentive to take as many points as possible,
participants received information that each point they
take out of the pool would be equal to a raffle in a lottery
being held after the completion of the study. The more
points they make, the higher would be their chances to
win one of the additional cash prices of €10. At the same
time, they were introduced to the dilemma structure of
the task with an example: If the pool had 75 points in the
first round, and the average consumption was 7 points
per round, then the pool would last for three rounds, and
everyone would have made 21 points on average.
However, if the average consumption was only 6 points
per round, the pool would last for four rounds, and
everyone would have made 24 points on average. It was
stressed again that the task would be over as soon as the
pool was empty. After completion of the study, five par-
ticipants were randomly drawn—independently of their
final outcomes in the commons dilemma—and informed
via e-mail that they had won a cash price.
Before the commons dilemma task began, we checked
participants’ understanding of the instructions with four
questions. Only if a participant answered all four
questions correctly he or she could proceed to the
commons dilemma task; otherwise the test had to be
repeated. After successfully passing the comprehen-
sion test, a waiting screen was presented where partic-
ipants were told that they had to wait for other
group members who had not yet finished with the
instructions in order to begin with the group task
simultaneously.
Manipulation of noise. The present manipulation of
noise has been tested and applied successfully in previ-
ous research with dyads (e.g., Tazelaar et al., 2004; Van
Lange et al., 2002). To participants in the experimental
group (i.e., with noise), it was emphasized that decisions
in everyday life sometimes have different consequences
than intended and that such uncertain outcomes would
be part of their group task. They learned that from time
to time, the computer would modify their decisions by
adding 0, 1, or 2 points to their intended consumption.
So they would always get as many points as they
wanted, but the number of points subtracted from the
pool could be bigger than that. The computer could per-
form such a modification in any trial without telling
them in advance. They were reminded in every round of
the task before making a decision that a modification
could possibly happen. Only after they had already
made a decision did they receive feedback whether the
computer had actually modified it. Finally, they learned
that all members of the group were affected by the mod-
ifications of the computer but not necessarily at the
same time and with the same magnitude. With this
manipulation, in analogy to real life, participants
always achieved their immediate goals (e.g., going from
A to B), but the consequences for the pool (e.g., the level
of fuel consumption) were sometimes worse than actu-
ally intended due to noise (e.g., the restricted access to
public transport), a fact that they realized only after
having made a choice.
Manipulation of pool size. Also, the present manipu-
lation of pool size has been applied repeatedly and
tested successfully in previous research (e.g., Brucks,
2004; Kramer et al., 1986; Roch & Samuelson, 1997).
The size of the pool was manipulated within-subjects by
giving participants preprogrammed feedback about the
availability of points in the pool. Two states of the pool
were simulated (i.e., big vs. small): In the first 12 rounds
(i.e., big pool), participants observed a pool that
increased from 75 to 93 points and then decreased
again down to 65 points (i.e., 75, 71, 79, 84, 93, 88, 80,
75, 71, 66, 59, and 65). This development should rep-
resent a more or less sustainable management and a big
pool. In the second 12 rounds (i.e., small pool), they
754 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
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received feedback that the pool continuously decreased
from 57 points down to 11 points (i.e., 57, 52, 46, 41,
38, 33, 26, 32, 24, 20, 16, and 11). This development
should represent severe overuse and a small pool. In
each round, the participants were informed about the
absolute number of points left in the pool and about the
development relative to the previous round (e.g., “the
pool contains 57 points in the present round, which is a
decrease of 8 points since the last round”). After 24
rounds, participants read that the group had emptied
the pool and the task was over.
Measurement of dependent variables. The dependent
variable of this study is participants’ consumption from
the common pool, measured in each round as the
number of points taken out of the pool. Due to the
within-subjects manipulation of pool size, we pooled
the first 12 repeated consumption decisions (i.e., big
pool) and the second 12 decisions (i.e., small pool).
Results
The overall consumption in the 24 rounds of the com-
mons dilemma task averaged 6.41 (SD = 1.89) points per
round. This is significantly more than a sustainable indi-
vidual choice would be, even when the pool had as much
as 93 points in round five, and a sustainable choice
would have been 6 points, t(134) = 2.5, p < .01. This
shows that in general, participants took more points
than the regeneration rate of the pool would have
allowed for sustainable management. In other words, it
is very likely that most groups would have overused the
common pool if its size had really been dependent on the
participants’ choices, leading to a similar decline of the
pool as the simulated one. In the following, we decom-
pose this overall mean with a 2 (social value orientation:
prosocials vs. proselfs) × 2 (noise: noise vs. no noise) × 2
(pool size: big vs. small) ANOVA, the latter variable
being a within-subjects variable (for means, see Table 1).
First, the analysis revealed the widely known main
effect for social value orientation, F(1, 131) = 3.97, p <
.05, η2 = .04. Across all conditions and over the whole
course of the task, proselfs (M = 6.74, SD = 2.31) exhib-
ited greater consumption than did prosocials (M = 6.10,
SD = 1.89). More important, the analysis also revealed
a three-way interaction between social value orienta-
tion, noise, and pool size, F(1, 131) = 6.30, p < .05, η2
= .05. Most interesting in this rather complex pattern of
means is the comparison between proselfs and proso-
cials. As can be seen, for proselfs the level of consump-
tion did not vary much across the four conditions (i.e.,
it ranged from 6.58 to 6.82), and indeed, the simple
two-way interaction of pool size and noise was not sig-
nificant for proselfs, F(1, 65) = 0.16, ns.3 In contrast, for
prosocials the level of consumption varied quite
strongly across the four conditions (i.e., it ranged from
5.61 to 6.76), and we found a significant simple inter-
action effect between pool size and noise for prosocials,
F(1, 66) = 10.68, p < .01, η2 = .14.
We further examined this latter interaction by ana-
lyzing the simple main effect of pool size for prosocials
in the condition where noise was absent and in the con-
dition where noise was present. In line with previous
research, in the absence of noise prosocials adapted to a
deteriorating pool by reducing their consumption from
6.20 to 5.61 points, F(1, 34) = 6.15, p < .05, η2 = .12.
Supporting our hypothesis about the effects of noise, in
the presence of noise prosocials increased their con-
sumption instead from 5.79 to 6.76 points, F(1, 32) =
6.03, p < .05, η2 = .16, when the pool deteriorated.
Thus, prosocials’ reaction to a deteriorating pool
changed drastically in a noisy environment.
DISCUSSION
These results indicate that noise plays an important
role in common-pool management in that it under-
mines cooperation among those who are otherwise
inclined to exercise restraint by saving resources. The
major findings are twofold. First, as predicted, when
the resource pool is close to being depleted, prosocials
no longer exercised restraint under conditions of
noise and exhibited levels of consumption that are
similar to that of proselfs. Second, the present find-
ings provide a perfect replication of the Kramer et al.
(1986) findings when noise is absent; however, when
noise is present, prosocials come to behave in a man-
ner that is “normally” typical of proselfs. Below,
we briefly discuss the meaning of these findings
and their implications, as well as some strengths and
limitations.
One important contribution of these findings is that
they provide evidence in support of the claim that noise
matters not only in dyadic situations but also in n-person
situations. It is good to realize that n-person situations
may often be as noisy as, or even noisier than, two-
person situations. The n-person situations are more com-
plex; the availability of information is more limited and
more of a challenge. In an n-person commons dilemma sit-
uation, people may often not be able to translate their good
intentions into appropriate conservational behavior due to
external barriers that prevent them from doing so. For
example, in many cases people are simply lacking the
means to act in a pro-environmental manner (e.g., a partial
absence of public transport), or these means are simply not
efficient enough (e.g., insufficient sanitary installations
such as a nonadjustable flusher). It may be—according to
Brucks, Van Lange / SOCIAL VALUES AND NOISE 755
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 24, 2010psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
the present results—that the awareness of noise is leading
to a reduced drive to obtain environmentally friendly and
collectively beneficial results when people get the feed-
back that the resource is in decline. The lesson learned
for real resource crises is, therefore, that people have to
be provided with as much experienced control as possi-
ble to act in a conservational manner (e.g., providing
the means to conserve; providing feedback about indi-
vidual consumptions).
Second, these findings provide evidence in support of
the notion that prosocials, who are usually prone to pre-
serve a common pool, are much more affected by the pres-
ence of noise than proselfs, who are usually prone to
overconsume. Therefore, the present findings can be con-
sidered as evidence that noisy environments do indeed
harm people’s motivation to reach a certain goal in com-
mons dilemmas, and that people with prosocial orienta-
tions are the ones whose motivation is most seriously
undermined by noise. Moreover, these effects were
observed when the consequences for the collective were
most severe—that is, when the collectively shared resources
are close to being depleted. Such findings may be observ-
able in everyday life in a variety of ways. Consider, for
example, an environmentally concerned person (a “green”
person) who is highly motivated to make an effort to
maintain a clean environment. This person may normally
behave in an environmentally friendly manner but may
cease to do so when (a) most others do not seem to make
an effort, and (b) when external barriers do not favor envi-
ronmentally friendly behavior. Generally, one may specu-
late that it takes both a supporting social environment
(e.g., others should also make an effort; see Schroeder,
Jensen, Reed, Sullivan, & Schwab, 1983) and a support-
ing physical environment (e.g., the experienced control
over behavioral options such as the appropriate availabil-
ity of public transport) for prosocials to persist in their
concern with collective interest.
Third and finally, this study also complements labora-
tory research on cooperation and competition in general
(e.g., Kopelman et al., 2002; Suleiman et al., 2004; Van
Vugt et al., 2000). Social dilemma studies in the labora-
tory, but also in the field, have almost exclusively been
designed as situations in which noise was not represented.
However, in everyday life noise seems to be the rule rather
than the exception. Prosocials’ radical shift of behavior
from careful conservation of a scarce resource to overus-
ing the available resources shows that researchers have to
be careful in generalizing findings observed in noise-free
social dilemma tasks to social dilemmas in the real world.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
The inclusion of the concept of noise, as an unintended
error in the interaction of dyads or barriers to individual
motivated behavior in groups, seems to be a promising
pathway to provide laboratory studies with greater eco-
logical validity. Indeed, the present findings are a prime
example of the kind of knowledge gain we can make by
conducting studies on noise in social-ecological interac-
tion. The methodological approach of replicating past
studies involving no noise and extending them with an
experimental condition of noise is well suited to demon-
strate that noise can make a big difference.
Some limitations of this study are also noteworthy.
To begin with, the hypothesis predicting detrimental
effects of noise for prosocials was based on the assump-
tion that prosocials become less motivated to preserve
the pool in the presence of noise because their attempts
to preserve the pool appear to be futile. Although this
line of reasoning is plausible, the present research did
not include measures to illuminate the mechanisms
underlying prosocials’ tendency to no longer exercise
restraint under noise, even when the resources are close
to being depleted. Hence, for future research it becomes
important to assess the specific motivational processes
underlying the radical change in prosocials—from default
prosocial behavior to overconsumption. In the follow-
ing, we offer some interpretations of the explanatory
potential of some mechanisms that may inform us about
future avenues for research and applications regarding
commons dilemmas.
The pattern of data in the noise condition may
remind us of the so-called overassimilation effect first
described by Kelly and Stahelski in 1970 and often
replicated in dyadic interactions. When prosocials are
facing constant noncooperation, they begin to assimi-
late that behavior and become equally or even more
competitive. As such, the overassimilation effect would
explain the behavior of prosocials in the noise condi-
tion. However, it is interesting to note that past research
on the commons dilemma (e.g., Kramer et al., 1986) has
revealed a reverse tendency. Prosocials facing a decreas-
ing resource due to overconsuming others do not at all
tend to assimilate such noncooperative behaviors. In
fact, they seem to disregard the noncooperative actions
of others and continue to contribute to saving resources
by behaving cooperatively. With our control condition
(no noise), we replicated this finding, thereby showing
that the overassimilation effect appears to be neutral-
ized when a common pool has to be managed.
Therefore, we have no reason to believe that the overas-
similation effect may account for the different behavior
of prosocials in the presence of noise. The key question
then becomes, If they do not assimilate to noncoopera-
tive behavior in the absence of noise, why do they do so
in the presence of noise?
We suggest that a plausible explanation for these
findings may be derived from the literature on perceived
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efficacy in social dilemmas (e.g., Kerr, 1989; Kerr &
Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). Specifically, we suggest that
repeated experience of noise in a commons dilemma
may leave people with a partial reduction of perceived
efficacy because their deliberate attempts to save the
pool from being depleted are getting corrupted by an
external agency out of their control. In turn, such a per-
ceived lack of efficacy may lead to feelings of reduced
personal responsibility for the common pool in the
sense of “I can’t help it anyway” (see also Schwartz,
1970, 1977). People may only feel responsible for the
fate of the common pool if they perceive themselves to
have the means to influence its future development, and
noise may undermine such (feelings of) perceived effi-
cacy. Reduced feelings of responsibility and efficacy
may ultimately lead to decreased levels of conserva-
tional motivation. People may only be motivated to
conserve resources if they can clearly see the effects of
their attempts, and as a consequence, they take over a
piece of the collective responsibility for the common
pool. As the conservational motivation of prosocials is
naturally higher than the one of proselfs, it seems plau-
sible that they suffer more from the presence of noise
and get less motivated to save resources, whereas pros-
elfs may be less affected by noise and therefore tend to
continue in their high levels of consumption whether
noise is present or not.
At the same time, the above account is not to deny
other interpretations. For example, it is possible that neg-
ative forms of noise reinforce noncooperative actions,
because negative noise may make people somewhat
familiar with noncooperative actions (e.g., experience
the fruits of it) or they may believe—largely erro-
neously, we suggest—that they cannot correct a possible
negative image following from negative noise. Although
these interpretations do not seem very plausible, given
our instructions that emphasized the third agent (i.e.,
the computer) bringing about noise, these specific mech-
anisms cannot be ruled out and are open to future
research.
Also, it would be useful to assess social value orienta-
tion a substantial period of time prior to the commons
dilemma to ensure that the findings cannot be explained
in terms of one of the self-presentational tendencies, such
as the tendency to appear consistent. Related to this issue,
the present measurement of social value orientations and
a typical commons dilemma task share a good deal of
methodological variance, which may explain the strong
main effect of social value orientation that is typically
found (see Camerer & Fehr, 2005). And last but not least,
the present research could be extended by increasing the
stakes (e.g., such as increasing the personal benefits of
consumption) in order to ensure that the participants are
taking the task seriously.
Concluding Remarks
It is an undeniable fact of everyday life that you can’t
always get what you want. Similarly, in commons dilem-
mas one cannot always reach good collective outcomes
even if one is strongly interested in pursuing that goal.
The present findings suggest that prosocial goals may be
fairly strongly undermined by an unsupportive physical
environment, which is represented by external barriers to
conservational behavior—or noise in social-ecological
interaction. It was observed by Kramer et al. (1986) that
prosocials may largely persist in resisting tendencies to
overconsumption even when the common pool is close to
being depleted. We know now that this conserving moti-
vation may be seriously undermined by the presence of
noise—a feature that we believe is frequent in real-life
commons dilemmas. Although the findings may convey
some pessimism regarding common-pool resources that
are close to depletion, we suggest that it is important to
know what can go wrong—when and why. We think we
have shown what can go wrong and when, and further
research must show why exactly it goes wrong.
NOTES
1. For this particular application of the concept of noise within
social-ecological interaction, we focus on negative noise only (see Van
Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002), in that the actual effects of
individual consumption on the pool are worse than intended. The def-
inition of positive noise, in contrast, would be that the actual outcome
of behavior is better than intended. However, we suggest that first, it
is more often the case that people’s consumption decisions have worse
outcomes for common-pool resources than intended, and that second,
and even more important, worse actual outcomes are of higher rele-
vance, motivationally as well as socially and ecologically.
2. Granted, a methodologically superior design would counterbal-
ance the manipulation of pool size by confronting a group of partici-
pants with a scarce pool in the beginning that is steadily increasing
over time, perhaps along with adding a control condition representing
no change in pool size. We did not do so because the design would
become rather demanding in terms of number of participants, and, as
assumed in much previous research (e.g., Roch & Samuelson, 1997),
there is good reason to believe that in everyday life commons dilem-
mas often represent a decline in pool size over time. Therefore, adding
the other conditions is still not ideal as it may confound realistic situ-
ations with ones that are somewhat less realistic.
3. Although one could consider using the overall error term in test-
ing simple main effects, we followed in part Keppel and Zedeck
(1989, pp. 323-327), who argue that for designs involving between-
subject and within-subject variables, it is useful to consider separate
error terms. In fact, in the present study, this conservative approach
still yielded significant effects, thus providing strong evidence for the
statistical reliability and magnitude of the effects (i.e., effect sizes var-
ied between .12 and .16).
REFERENCES
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic
Books.
Axelrod, R., & Dion, D. (1988). The further evolution of coopera-
tion. Science, 242(4884), 1385-1390.
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 24, 2010psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
758 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Bendor, J., Kramer, R. M., & Stout, S. (1991). When in doubt . . . :
Cooperation in a noisy prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 35(4), 691-719.
Brucks, W. M. (2004). Kollektive Ressourcenbewirtschaftung aus
sozialpsychologischer Perspektive [A social psychological perspec-
tive on resource management]. Lengerich, Germany: Pabst Science
Publishers.
Camerer, C. R., & Fehr, E. (2005). Measuring social norms and pref-
erences using experimental games: A guide for social scientists. In
J. Henrich. R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, & H. Gintis
(Eds.), Foundations of human sociality—Experiments and ethno-
graphic evidence from fifteen small scale societies (pp. 55-95).
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Boles, T. L. (1998). Share and share alike or
winner take all? The influence of social value orientation upon
choice and recall of negotiation heuristics. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, 253-276.
Gifford, R., & Hine, D. W. (1997). Towards cooperation in the com-
mons dilemma. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 29(3),
167-178.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859),
1243-1248.
Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E.,
& Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003). An atlas of interpersonal situa-
tions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of
cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 16(1), 66-91.
Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal relations: A
theory of interdependence. New York: John Wiley.
Keppel, G., & Zedeck, S. (1989). Data analysis for research designs:
Analysis of variance and multiple regression/correlation approaches.
New York: Freeman.
Kerr, N. L. (1989). Illusions of efficacy: The effects of group size on
perceived efficacy in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 25(4), 287-313.
Kerr, N. L., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M. (1997). “and besides, I
probably couldn’t have made a difference anyway”: Justification
of social dilemma defection via perceived self-inefficacy. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 211-230.
Kopelman, S., Weber, M. J., & Messick, D. M. (2002). Factors influ-
encing cooperation in commons dilemmas: A review of experimen-
tal psychological research. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C.
Stern, S. Stovich, & E. U. Weber (Eds.), The drama of the commons
(pp. 113-156). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Kramer, R. M., McClintock, C. G., & Messick, D. M. (1986). Social
values and cooperative response to a simulated resource conserva-
tion crisis. Journal of Personality, 54, 576-592.
Kuhlman, D. M., Camac, C. R., & Cunha, D. A. (1986). Individual
differences in social orientation. In H. A. M. Wilke, D. M.
Messick, & C. G. Rutte (Eds.), Experimental social dilemmas (pp.
151-176). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Verlag Peter Lang.
Kuhlman, D. M., & Marshello, A. F. J. (1975). Individual differ-
ences in game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strat-
egy effects in prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 32(5), 922-931.
McClintock, C. G., & Allison, S. T. (1989). Social value orientation
and helping behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 19,
353-362.
Messick, D. M., Wilke, H., Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M., Zemke, P.
E., & Lui, L. (1983). Individual adaptations and structural change
as solutions to social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 44(2), 294-309.
Mosler, H. J., & Brucks, W. M. (2003). Integrating commons dilemma
findings in a general dynamic model of cooperative behavior
in resource crises. European Journal of Social Psychology, 33,
119-133.
Parks, C. D. (1994). The predictive ability of social values in resource
dilemmas and public goods games. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 20(4), 431-438.
Roch, S. G., & Samuelson, C. D. (1997). Effects of environmental
uncertainty and social value orientation in resource dilemmas.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70(3),
221-235.
Rumble, A. C., Van Lange, P. A. M., & Parks, C. D. (2005). The
benefits of empathy: When empathy may sustain cooperation in
social dilemmas. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Samuelson, C. D. (1993). A multiattribute evaluation approach to
structural change in resource dilemmas. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 55, 298-324.
Samuelson, C. D., Messick, D. M., Rutte, C. G., & Wilke, H. (1984).
Individual and structural solutions to resource dilemmas in two cul-
tures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(1), 94-104.
Schroeder, D. A., Jensen, T. D., Reed, A. J., Sullivan, D. K., &
Schwab, M. (1983). The actions of others as determinants of
behavior in social trap situations. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 19, 522-539.
Schwartz, S. H. (1970). Moral decision making and behavior. In J.
Macauley & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior
(pp. 251-268). New York: Academic Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (1977). Normative influences on altruism. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol.
10, pp. 221-279). New York: Academic Press.
Suleiman, R., Budescu, D. V., Fischer, I., & Messick, D. M. (2004).
Contemporary psychological research on social dilemmas.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Tazelaar, M. J. A., Van Lange, P. A. M., & Ouwerkerk, J. W.
(2004). How to cope with noise in social dilemmas: The benefits
of communication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
87(6), 845-859.
Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and
equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orien-
tation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(2), 337-
349.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Agnew, C. R., Harinck, F., & Steemers, G. E.
M. (1997). From game theory to real life: How social value orien-
tation affects willingness to sacrifice in ongoing close relation-
ships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73,
1330-1344.
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Kuhlman, D. M. (1994). Social value ori-
entations and impressions of partner’s honesty and intelligence: A
test of the might versus morality effect. Journal of Personality &
Social Psychology, 67(1), 126-141.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. N., & Joireman,
J. A. (1997). Development of prosocial, individualistic, and com-
petitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence. Journal of
Personality & Social Psychology, 73(4), 733-746.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Ouwerkerk, J. W., & Tazelaar, M. J. A. (2002).
How to overcome the detrimental effects of noise in social interac-
tion: The benefits of generosity. Journal of Personality & Social
Psychology, 82(5), 768-780.
Van Vugt, M., Snyder, M., Tyler, T. R., & Biel, A. (2000). Cooperation
in modern society. Promoting the welfare of communities, states and
organizations. London: Routledge.
Wilke, H. A. M. (1991). Greed, efficiency, and fairness in resource
management situations. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.),
European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 165-187).
Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Wu, J., & Axelrod, R. (1995). How to cope with noise in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(1), 183-189.
Received May 16, 2006
Revision accepted November 9, 2006
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 24, 2010psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
